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Abstract 
This paper develops a framework for making decisions on the type of infrastructure to 
build and where to build. The basic intuition is that by deriving the marginal physical 
products of installed infrastructure, we can prioritize infrastructure investment of the 
same type among regions, and of different types within a region. 
The methodology is to estimate a panel of regional production functions that allows 
the intercepts to capture individual differences ("the fixed effects") but uses interactive 
dummies to capture the effect of individual differences on marginal productivity. This 
framework could be a useful tool for the management of public capital in an economy 
subject to fiscal federalism, particularly where the interaction of interest group struggles 
and the politics of centre-state grants may involve difficult trade-offs. 
1. Introduction 
This study develops a method for prioritizing additional infrastructure investment by ranking the marginal product of existing facilities. Such a contribution to the literature 
on the formal analysis of infrastructure investment may be useful in public finance. In 
particular, we focus on two aspects of the multifarious decision process of allocating 
infrastructure investment in a fiscal federalism—the simultaneous decision of what to 
build and where to build. Our principal interest in initiating this line of research is to 
further analyse the extent to which political power affects decisions on geographic 
allocation of infrastructure expenditures. This is an issue that can only assume more 
importance with increasing democracy and decentralization. 
The proposition that public capital stock has significant positive effects on private 
sector output, productivity and capital formation is known as the public capital hypothesis. 
The premise is that the stock of public capital raises private sector output both directly 
and indirectly. "The direct effect because it provides intermediate services to private 
firms. The indirect effect from an assumption that public and private capital are 
complements in production" (Tatom, 1991: 3).1 
Past government investment activities in Nigeria (and elsewhere) have been criticized 
for being wasteful and highly inefficient (Krueger, 1990; Faruquee and Husain, 1994). 
Wasteful expenditure from this source raises concern because of the order of magnitude 
usually associated with infrastructure investment.2 Such profligate spending adds 
significantly to fiscal deficits already under pressure from government's budgetary 
spending, and from loss-making public enterprises. The macroeconomic implications 
are not hard to figure out—high inflation rates, heavy debt overhang, disincentive to 
financial savings and crowding out of private investment.3 
The monetary-fiscal policy connection can be troubling when monetary policy is 
accommodative of government's preferred spending patterns. Exchange rate policies are 
also critical factors in infrastructure investment as almost all materials and equipment 
are imported, while a significant portion of the funds are borrowed externally. For instance, 
since 1987, Nigeria's external debt service ratio has averaged between 4 and 5% of GDP, 
and since 1958 the World Bank has approved 98 loans and credits for a total commitment 
of $6.8 billion, the largest aggregate infrastructure lending to any single country in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
There is little disagreement that developing countries "need to get their macroeconomic 
policies right" in the sense of avoiding over-valued exchange rates and keeping their 
inflation and budget deficits low. But there is concern (World Bank, 1994: 171) that 
"there is little scope for cutting overall public spending in many countries, although the 
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composition of spending can and should be improved." Furthermore, while public capital 
may provide valuable services to private firms, close substitutes for these same services 
could also be available from private producers. If so, some types of public capital may 
crowd out private capital formation by lowering the value of acquiring new private capital. 
Reorienting spending priorities to shift resources to education and infrastructure would 
be both sound and feasible, but the task of "picking winners is likely to produce the same 
government failures and inefficiencies that hampered economic development in the past 
decades."4 
Furthermore, the fact that the linkage between infrastructure and economic 
development clearly depends on the individual location in question means that prioritizing 
spending may not in general be a trivial task. Therefore, it is important to have a properly 
articulated policy on spending priorities—a policy that is based on a disaggregated study 
of the particular economy in view, particularly as not all worthwhile programmes can be 
implemented. Limits to public sector programming, implementation and managerial 
capacity, as well as budgetary constraints, imply that priorities must be set. The lack of 
clear priorities hinders achievement of desirable goals and intensifies the pressure to 
spend even more, thereby making it more difficult to rein in deficits and control inflation: 
Adjustment alone will not put countries on a sustained, poverty-reducing 
growth path. That is the challenge of long-term development, which requires 
better economic policies and more investment in human capital, 
infrastructure, and institution-building along with better governance.... 
(World Bank, 1994a: 2) 
2. Review of related literature 
The connection between infrastructure and economic development is firmly rooted in the development literature. One of the early treatments was by Rosenstein-Rodan 
(1943), who analysed the demand side of capital formation and particularly identified 
one category of physical capital for special attention—the social overhead capital. 
According to him, not only was this class of capital characterized by nonconvexities 
(which he referred to as generalized external economies), but they constituted prerequisites 
to private sector investment. However, it was much later that Aschauer (1989a/b), in 
linking infrastructure to productivity slow down in the USA, econometrically attempted 
to establish the empirical connection implied in Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). Most of the 
research in this area has focused on the United States and other developed countries 
where the issues have been whether there ever was a shortage of infrastructure investment 
and how the fact (of the shortage) was established. Gramlich (1994) estimates that these 
issues have generated at least 40 econometric studies using various data and techniques. 
The literature addresses issues of the definition of infrastructure capital from two 
basic perspectives. One broad definition is rooted in the economically sensible definition 
of large capital-intensive natural monopolies (although in some countries they are privately 
owned). The other, which is expedient in applied work, is based on a narrow definition 
of just the tangible stock owned by the public sector. The literature also notes that like 
other public goods, some benefits of infrastructure capital such as improved security, 
time saving, improved health and a cleaner environment are magnitudes that are difficult 
to measure and thus are not included in official measures of national output. "Hence it 
will also be difficult to relate infrastructure to [all of] its goals, or changes in them" 
(Gramlich, 1994: 1178). 
Nonetheless, a strand of the literature estimates the impact of infrastructure on 
productivity by imposing the Cobb-Douglas functional form with the influence of public 
capital explicitly modelled. Examples are Aschauer (1989a, 1993), Holtz-Eakin (1992) 
and Fernald (1993), to name a few. Other authors such as Aaron (1990), Jorgenson (1991) 
and Tatom (1991) have expressed concern about estimates of rates of return on public 
capital coming out of previous studies. The critics contend that the numbers are overly 
optimistic and simply suspect. Yet other criticisms focus on the possible misspecification 
of the dynamics of the variable for public capital stock. They reason that many of the 
stocks of building do not have the implied short-term impact on the supply of aggregate 
output. This observation, they note, makes the high rates of return even more implausible. 
Subsequently, these and other econometric problems have been addressed, some 
(Rubin, 1991) for example by mining various definitions of the appropriate stock of 
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capital.5 One particular definition—core infrastructure, meaning highways, water and 
sewerage systems, that is, a large component of state and local government stock— 
yields the highest output elasticity and so fails to resolve the puzzle. As a consequence, 
Gramlich (1994) recommends pooled time-series cross-section data across states 
(expenditure units) as a way of mitigating some of the econometric problems raised in 
the previous studies. This approach gives more plausible estimates of the implied rate of 
return on infrastructure investment. Munnell (1990), Eisner (1991), Eberts (1990) and 
Holtz-Eakin (1992) followed this approach. Munnell (1992) summarizes these findings. 
There is little doubt that infrastructure generally supports economic activities. What 
is not obvious is the degree to which public infrastructure stimulates economic 
development in specific locations. Fox and Smith (1990) discuss the relationship between 
public infrastructure policy and economic development, and conclude that infrastructure 
cannot be expected to stimulate the economies of all communities, but most communities 
can benefit from exploring new ways to deliver infrastructure services more efficiently. 
They argue that new infrastructure is less likely to boost economic development in lagging 
regions than in intermediate or congested regions because few other characteristics 
(development ingredients) are present to attract new economic activities. Some lagging 
regions actually face disinvestment because of inability to maintain existing facilities. 
Building infrastructure will probably not overcome an unskilled labour force, inadequate 
raw materials or long distance to markets.6 
Easterly and Levine (1994) attempt to explain "Africa's growth tragedy" by using a 
cross-sectional regression on a list of variables thought to explain growth. One of the 
variables that do not show up as significant is the measure for infrastructure investment. 
This is interesting in view of the many studies of Africa that cite the poor state of its 
infrastructure. Aschauer's (1989a) influential paper claimed to have found large effects 
on US productivity growth. Canning and Fay (1993) report similar findings for a 
cross-country sample, although cross-sectional study by Khan and Reinhart (1993) failed 
to find significant growth effects. Canning and Fay used physical measures of 
infrastructure such as kilometres of roads and railways per worker, electricity-generating 
capacity per worker, and telephones per worker. Easterly and Levine (1994) find no 
significant effect of either roads, railways or electricity generation. This is hardly 
surprising, given the level of aggregation at which the study was conducted and the 
failure to account for the quality dimension of the existing infrastructure. To the extent 
allowed by the available data set for this study, we take account of the variation in quality 
across regions for the same infrastructure type. 
Polenske (1994) summarizes the state of both the theoretical and empirical literature 
on public infrastructure and productivity. She finds that competent researchers have 
reached opposite conclusions on the relationship between regional economic performance 
and infrastructure expenditure and views this as convincing evidence that more work is 
needed on the topic. A review of the empirical research reveals that the productivity 
effects of public capital vary from negative to positive and from small to large with 
causality working in either direction. Polenske (1994: 476) observes: 
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Theory currently provides little guidance regarding possible outcomes, but 
there are three critical issues which mainly concern analysts in industrial 
economies although applicable to developing countries as well: (1) The 
development of clearly stated theoretical expectations concerning the 
economic impact of public investment ... that will lead to the design and 
testing of improved models for gauging the productivity of public investment. 
(2) The improvement of data used in empirical research, particularly 
regarding infrastructure lives, depreciation, and the role of maintenance ... 
in the growth of net capital stock. (3) The changing institutional arrangement 
that affects public investment, especially in view of the current emphasis 
on privatization. 
On the last item, Polenske cites Lee and Anas (1992), who propose several policies 
for responding to Nigeria's current infrastructure deficiencies, including regulatory 
reforms, private sector participation, and alternative pricing to account for capacity 
limitations and congestion. 
3. Methodology and empirical estimates 
Profile of data and outline of methodology 
The basic quantitative methodology for estimating the marginal efficiency of core 
infrastructure is based on Ratner (1983). That model is the first to explicitly add public 
capital to the production function to test whether the marginal product of public capital 
is positive (with respect to private production). The model assumes that the business 
sector production function can be approximated with a Cobb-Douglas functional form: 
where A is a scale parameter, ht measures business sector hours, k, measures the flow 
of services from Kt, the inflation-adjusted stock of private capital at the end of the 
previous year, gt, measures the flow of services from Gt, the public capital stock at the 
end of the previous year, r is the rate of disembodied technical change, t is a time trend, 
and v, is the error term. The utilization rate for the flow of private capital services is 
assumed to be measured by the index of manufacturing capacity utilization, c,. The 
utilization rate for the flow of infrastructure services is assumed to be measured by a 
quality index, 6, which has changed little during the period analysed. Therefore, gt 
equals 0Gt, and k, is ctKr 
The production function allows returns to scale that are either decreasing, constant or 
increasing. Also, Equation 1 can be log-transformed to: 
Some economic meanings can be given to the exponents a, (5 and 5. Each exponent 
indicates the relative share of that input in the total product, while the sum of the exponents 
measures the return to scale. In Equation 2, these exponents are interpreted as (partial) 
elasticities of output with respect to a unit of that input. The goal is to estimate the values 
of these exponents. 
The variables for core infrastructure are: (1) kilometres of "motorable" roads, (2) 
percentage population with access to potable water through either stand pipe or house 
connection, (3) electric power consumed as (an admittedly unsatisfactory) proxy for 
(1) 
ln(—), = In A + a ln(—), = S In(-^L) + rt + v, 
cK ' cK ' c,K, 
Q 
(2) 
NIGERIA: TOWARDS AN OPTIMAL MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 7 
power infrastructure, and (4) number of telephone main lines.7 A detailed description of 
the data set is in the Annex. 
Empirical methodolgy 
We use a model that captures the relationship between regional economic performance 
and installed infrastructure, while allowing for characteristic differences among the states. 
We also seek an efficient method of estimation and an inference procedure that together 
allow us to analyse our results. We begin with a general representation of the panel data: 
K 
y„=+X to+^ (3) 
where I =1,2,..., N denotes a cross sectional unit (a state), and t = 1,2,..,,T denotes a given 
period. Thus yjt is the value of the dependent variable (output) for state i at period t, and 
%. is the value of the yth non-stochastic explanatory variable for state i at period t. The 
random error term e. is assumed to have a mean of zero, and a constant variance. The a's u ' t 
and p..'s are unknown response coefficients to be modelled. 
As there may be correlation between the error terms in each of the sets of equations, 
it is plausible that these errors are rooted in some common unmeasurable or omitted 
factors, and so should be expected to exhibit some (contemporaneous) correlation. In 
addition, it is assumed that with contemporaneous correlation, 
[ <7. -V/ = h 
Eieitejh) = \oyt*h (4) 
Thus we have as the contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the joint disturbance 
vector, 
a u a l 2 . . . a 1 N 
o2la21...G2N 
The parameters of interest are the estimates of the state-specific marginal physical 
products of the core infrastructure. For various reasons, these estimates of marginal 
products can vary across some states. Sources of variation that easily come to mind are 
differences in the quality of governance, in the initial stock of human capital, in the 
dominant cultural influence in each state, in the level of economic development, and in 
other historical developments such as location factors (climate and natural resources). 
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We believe that if states did not differ and all other things were held equal, then the 
purely technical role of each infrastructure facility in augmenting output—measured as 
the marginal rate of product transformation—would be the same across all regions. 
However, the past experiences of Nigerians from the civil war in the 1960s and its 
aftermath, condition decisions on private investment and occupational mobility. The more 
"Asunken" is the nature of an investment, the less mobile across regions is private capital 
flow into such an investment. Similarly, the more idiosyncratic is an occupation, the less 
mobile across regions is labour ex ante. We expect these facts of resource flow to also 
influence the degree of diversity of private capital—the immobility of factors should 
prevent marginal products from completely equalizing. These enumerated diversities 
across political regions are modelled by allowing the response coefficients to differ in 
the panel. 
The question that then arises is whether the fixed differences across regions are 
correlated with the infrastructure variables. The answer is, yes. Using Lagos as an example, 
we can relate the level of access to potable water, the density of the network of roads and 
the density of the network of telephones in that metropolis to its preeminent position in 
the political and commercial history of Nigeria. For a long time, it was the seat of the 
federal government and later also doubled as the seat of a state government. It is still the 
commercial nerve centre of the nation. Most, if not all, the policy makers involved in 
earlier decisions to install infrastructure facilities lived and worked in the Lagos metropolis. 
Regions that have attained a higher level of urbanization are associated with higher levels 
of infrastructure stock. For instance, pit latrines are now banned in most urban areas. 
Therefore states with higher levels of urbanization demand more access to piped water, 
although the quality of water so delivered is not necessarily better. 
Using quality of governance as another example, we point to the former Western 
Region of Nigeria, which is endowed with a relatively better quality infrastructure. This 
can easily be partially attributed to the foresight of the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, 
who was very much development oriented in his approach to governance.8 The Western 
Region boasts a string of firsts in infrastructure-related variables—the first stadium in 
Nigeria (Liberty Stadium), the first-to-be the most populous modern city in Nigeria 
(Ibadan), the first university, as well as the first teaching hospital in Nigeria (University 
of Ibadan), the first broadcasting station in Nigeria, and home of an important road 
transportation nexus (Ibadan) from Lagos to the Eastern and Northern regions. The 
implication of having these fixed differences correlate with the infrastructure variables 
is that it requires an empirical modelling that treats the correlation more explicitly. Such 
a treatment can be handled conveniently within a dummy variable model. 
The following model is based on the production function specified in Equation 2. It 
allows the estimates of the intercepts to capture individual differences (fixed effects), 
but uses interactive dummies to capture the effect of the individual differences on marginal 
productivity. By this, we aim to uncover variations across regions of the marginal product 
of infrastructure, as well as to rank infrastructures within the same region. For a given 
political region /(=1,...^V), within a period t(=l,...,T) where for convenience the time 
subscripts are suppressed, we have: 
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N K 
>'i = 0{i + I ; = 2(ai - al)Di + 1 i = l V / l J 
. + 
N K n 
i = 2 j = 1 y Hlj ' 1 1 (5) 
where 
f l 
Dj(i — 2,...,N) = < for an observation in state i else, 
0 
DZi(i = 2,...,N) = 
ejXiju = i - , K ) 
for an observation in state i else, 
0 
6 is the quality index for variable j, and Lit (cKi) t is the labour-capital ratio for 
state i. The measure for h is the economically active labour force. dk is the rate of 
employment in state i in year t. Therefore 6th is the quantity of labour input in region 
i in a given period. The choice of the reference state (i = 1) is arbitrary. Equation 5 
corresponds to a regression of y on D, x, Dx and a constant term. Here, the constant term 
measures the scale parameter; and for the reference state, it incorporates the individual 
effect as well. D is the individual effect for all the other states (i.e., V/ & 1) and x is the 
set of infrastructure variables; and Dx, the "interactive dummy", captures the impact of 
the individual effect on an infrastructure. All the necessary transformations of the variables 
to conform to the functional form specified in Equation 2 are made, with output y = 
ln(cK)t and the infrastructure variables summarized by ln(). 
We gain efficiency by jointly considering all the equations (pooling the cross-section) 
to use the contemporaneous correlation across equations. An efficient method of estimation 
is the method of generalized least squares (GLS), particularly the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression procedure (see Zellner, 1962,1963). This version of the GLS obtains single 
equation estimates of the parameters of the model, and uses these to form a consistent 
estimate of the residual covariance matrix of the structure specified in Equation 4. We 
assert and test three different hypotheses. The first is a test for regional differences in the 
production functions. The second and third hypotheses prioritize infrastructure across 
regions and within regions, respectively. 
The first null hypothesis of identical production function (conversely uniform output 
elasticity) may be parameterized as 
H0:RP= 0 
with 
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ij i2 0 0...0 
0 i2 - i 3 0...0 
0 0 i3 - i 4 . . . 0 
0 0 0 0. . .- / N 
as an (N - l)x N matrix containing K x K identity submatrixes. /3 = jS,/^/^)' is an N x 1 
matrix whose elements are the vector of estimated slope coefficients, and 0 is a null 
matrix. The linear restrictions may be summarized as, 
Our test is the likelihood ratio (LR) test, which compares constrained and unconstrained 
estimates. The LR test can be implemented by obtaining the value of the logarithm of the 
likelihood evaluated at the estimated parameters. If we define LRur as the value of the 
likelihood function for the maximum of the unconstrained model and LR as the value r 
when the constraints are imposed, then the likelihood ratio statistic is 
A = 2(LRur -LRr) 
The LR statistic A is distributed asymptotically as a X2(P) where n is the degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of constraints.9 The difference between the constrained 
and the unconstrained models is that the interactive dummies (Dxs) are excluded in the 
constrained model. Therefore, we have two sets of regressions: one that allows for separate 
intercepts and a common slope, and one that allows for both the intercepts and slopes to 
differ across regions. 
The null of Hypothesis 2 asserts that for the same type of infrastructure, marginal 
products across regions are equal. The test is parameterized as: 
H0:R(b'/3) = 0 
and tested with the Wald test of exclusionary restrictions. R is as previously defined, and 
b' [} = is a n N x 1 column matrix whose elements are the vector of 
the derived marginal products of the set of infrastructures from the N regions, b is the 
output-input ratio ( Q / G ) , and /3 is the regression estimate of the output elasticity. 
Specifically the test analyses that the 18 pairs of linear restrictions 
W - W i V y ! = W n y * y - V v -
hold jointly for j ranging from 1 to 4, which corresponds to water, power, 
telecommunications and highways in the 19 states. A Wald test statistic for testing H0 is 
given by 
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(bjjfiij ~ bj+l jPi+i j )2 
[bl var(Ay) + bf+lj var(5 i + u) - 2 ^ , . + l y c o v ^ A , , , ) ] 
where biJPij(i = 1,AT,18) is the GLS estimator of b^fty, while var(.) and cov(.) are the 
estimates of variance and covariance of (3t], respectively. Under the null hypothesis, Q.j 
is distributed ^{218) asymptotically. 
The test of Hypothesis 3 examines the equality of the marginal products of the 
infrastructure within a state. The null hypothesis asserts, 
and can be tested with the same Wald test specified above. The appropriate test statistic 
is 
where bio(3n and b!kfijk(k = 2,.. . ,4) are, respectively, the GLS estimators of /?,, A,, and 
while var(.) and cov(.) are the estimates of variance and covariance of fijk, respectively. 
Under the null hypothesis of equality of the marginal products, O- is distributed 
asymptotically. The results of these tests are reported below. 
The estimation uses panel data on the 19 states of the Federation. Our data cover 1985 to 
1995. We can only go as far back as 1985 because of data constraints. And although 
more states were created subsequently from the 19 states, we nonetheless merged the 
observations from the spin-off states into their corresponding parent states to form a 
geographically consistent data set. 
The hypothesis of an identical production function is clearly rejected. Therefore, we 
cannot impose an aggregate production as the proper specification for analysing 
productivity in this economy. Our dummy variable model, which allows diversities among 
regions, and also allows these diversities to influence public capital, appears to fit the 
data fairly well, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.83. Table 1 reports the results for the 
first hypothesis. 
fy/Av = fykPik; i = 1,. • •, 19, & = 2,... 4, 
( b u P „ - b i k M 2 
var i f i a ) + bl var(fi,,)-2Z>,A cov(A,A*>] 
Empirical estimates 
1 2 
Table 1: Regression parameters and Hypothesis 1 test results 
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Unrestricted regression Restricted regression 
Standard error of regression 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 














Notes: Hypothesis 1 tests for equality of output elasticities across the states. The restricted regression is: 
i M j X , +wLi+rt + ei, 
and the unrestricted is: 
^ = o ; i = i , ' = 2 { a i - a i ) D i + 1 / ! i V / i J + i i ! i = 2 
Estimates of the output elasticities, their associated standard errors and the elasticities 
of production are listed in tables 2,3 and 4, respectively. The marginal physical products 
for each of the infrastructures across the 19 states are listed in Table 5. We know that 
production functions can exhibit constant returns to scale at some points in input space 
and increasing or decreasing returns to scale at other points. A local measure of returns 
to scale, defined at a point in input space, is the elasticity of production—the sum of all 
the elasticities of output with respect to the various inputs at that point. According to 
Table 4, returns to scale vary from decreasing to constant to increasing. We view these 
estimates as highly imprecise, however, presumably due to estimating so many parameters 
with a relatively limited amount of poor quality data. As is typical of infrastructure stock 
variables, the time series display very little variation. Most of the variation would have 
come from adjustments for depreciation that should affect the net capital stock. 
Unfortunately, this information is not routinely kept even though its availability would 
be a big step towards better measures of infrastructure stock, as has been pointed out in 
the literature. The low variation across time can induce high standard errors in the 
parameter estimates. 
NIGERIA: TOWARDS AN OPTIMAL MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 1 3 
Table 2: Estimates of the response coefficients and the implied output elasticities of water 
and power 
States Estimate Standard Output Estimate Standard Output 
of water error elasticity of power error elasticity 
Anambra 0.88 1.0558 0.88 -0.47 1.1681 -0.47 
Bauchi -0.97 1.5244 -0.08 0.01 1.8850 -0.47 
Bendel -2.98 7.5324 -2.10 1.02 1.7108 0.54 
Benue 0.01 1.7357 0.90 0.16 1.5969 -0.32 
Borno -3.90 2.1889 -3.01 -1.56 1.3568 -2.04 
Cross River -0.85 2.2431 0.03 0.14 1.4373 -0.34 
Gongola -0.53 1.6719 0.35 0.76 1.7805 0.28 
Imo -5.02 2.3462 -4.13 -0.65 1.5453 -1,12 
Kaduna -0.33 1.8437 0.56 -0.24 3.4865 -0.71 
Kano -1.44 1.7007 -0.56 2.20 1.8623 1.72 
Kwara -0.06 2.8650 0.82 0.35 1.2823 -0.13 
Lagos -0.47 1.7982 0.41 0.43 2.2068 -0.04 
Niger -0.90 1.8666 -0.01 0.11 1.3224 -0.37 
Ogun -1.18 3.0174 -0.30 0.36 2.2168 -0.11 
Ondo -0.92 1.4026 -0.04 0.75 1.4799 0.27 
Oyo -12.58 2.4410 -11.70 -0.45 1.2905 -0.93 
Plateau -0.98 1.5130 -0.09 0.77 1.3957 0.29 
Rivers -2.58 1.2414 -1.69 1.54 1.5387 1.07 
Sokoto 0.12 4.6820 1.01 0.60 1.6714 0.12 
Notes: The tabulated estimates for water, (/ii1 - j311 )'s, and power, (Pl2 - /312)'s, are deviations from the reference 
state. So, to recover the output elasticity for water, [i?v we add j3u and (/J21 -
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Table 3: Estimates of the response coefficients and the implied output elasticities of telecom 
and highways 
States Estimate Standard Output Estimate Standard Output 
of telecom error elasticity of highways error elasticity 
Anambra -0.55 1.1231 -0.55 0.32 0.6011 0.32 
Bauchi 0.56 1.1781 0.13 1.44 2.5573 1.76 
Bendel 0.25 4.0198 -0.30 -1.27 1.3447 -0.96 
Benue 3.96 4.0378 3.41 -1.16 2.2792 -0.84 
Borno -2.40 2.1107 -2.95 6.34 1.9018 6.65 
Cross River 0.00 5.3691 -0.55 0.44 0.9061 0.76 
Gongola 0.98 5.0018 0.42 1.99 6.1605 2.31 
Imo -5.06 3.2905 -5.61 -0.34 1.0012 -0.07 
Kaduna 0.78 1.8851 0.25 -0.15 0.7443 0.16 
Kano 0.78 1.3123 0.25 -0.64 0.9102 -0.32 
Kwara 0.84 1.7427 0.29 -1.29 6.4011 -0.97 
Lagos -0.53 2.1323 -1.08 -0.23 1.1737 0.08 
Niger 0.19 2.7377 -0.36 2.37 2.7523 2.69 
Ogun 0.03 2.6248 -0.53 0.29 1.4758 0.60 
Ondo 0.91 2.3796 0.35 0.00 1.0850 0.31 
Oyo 9.70 2.5167 9.15 0.14 1.1480 0.46 
Plateau -0.16 4.5295 -0.71 -0.13 4.2088 0.19 
Rivers -8.39 3.0681 -8.94 0.13 3.0633 0.45 
Sokoto 1.55 3.3880 1.00 0.03 1.1447 0.35 
Labour-capital ratio 1.09 0.1291 
Tech progress -0.035 0.0491 
Notes: The tabulated estimates for telecom, - [)Js, and highways, - PH)% are deviations from 
reference state. So, to recover the output elasticity for telecom, /?23, we add f i 13 
Table 4: Returns to scale parameter (elasticities of production) 
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Table 5: Derived marginal products 
States Water Power Telecom Highway 
Anambra 1.2970 -0.00071 -0.0000 0.0004 
Bauchi -2.1293 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0029 
Bendel -4.1054 0.0010 -0.0000 -0.0012 
Benue 1.2987 0.0003 0.0018 -0.0009 
Borrio -4.2290 -0.0161 -0.0011 0.0033 
Cross River -1.2245 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0017 
Gongola 0.0219 0.0130 0.0011 0.0026 
Imo -7.0684 -0.0035 -0.0009 -0.0003 
Kaduna 1.0689 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0003 
Kano -0.8720 0.0043 0.0001 -0.0007 
Kwara 1.2543 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 
Lagos 1.2324 -0.0007 -0.0000 0.0003 
Niger 1.1628 -0.0006 -0.0000 0.0006 
Oguri 0.6038 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0007 
Ondo 1.0217 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 
Oyo -8.2489 -0.0013 0.0005 0.0005 
Plateau 1.0387 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0003 
Rivers -18.8534 0.0172 -0.0124 0.0010 
Sokoto 1.5434 0.0047 0.0008 0.0005 
The marginal products can be interpreted in terms of the need to optimize—operate 
within the economic region of production (where the marginal products of the inputs are 
positive). In the circumstance, a negative marginal product of infrastructure components 
does not mean a scaling back of the facilities, which often are inadequate or 
malfunctioning. We interpret the marginal products as signalling the direction of optimal 
adjustment of inputs. Consider, for example, the oil rich coastal region of Rivers State. 
The ordering of facilities suggests that it could use more power and highways to improve 
overall productivity. Similarly, the arid northern regions of Sokoto State could use more 
water supply and power to augment productivity. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 use these derived marginal physical products as the basis for 
ranking infrastructure facilities across regions, and within a region. Therefore, combining 
the two hypotheses forms the basis for prioritizing infrastructure investment. The test 
results are reported in tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 6: Hypothesis 2 test results 
Infrastructure p-value Z2(m 
Water 0.00260 39.2925 
Power 0.79180 12.9961 
Telecom 0.00250 39.4213 
Highways 0.50656 17.2415 
Note: Hypothesis 2 tests for equality of marginal products across regions for the same type of infrastructure. 
Table 7: Hypothesis 3 test results 
State p-value J2(8) 
Anambra 0.7616 1.1640 
Bauchi 0.7284 1.3027 
Bendel 0.4412 2.6941 
Benue 0.7467 1.2261 
Bomo 0.0430 8.1498 
Cross River 0.9836 0.1609 
Gongola 0.9643 0.2768 
Imo 0.1421 5.4428 
Kaduna 0.9773 0.2021 
Kano 0.6051 1.8454 
Kwara 0.9659 0.2678 
Lagos 0.9854 0.1491 
Niger 0.9130 0.5266 
Ogun 0.9629 0.2848 
Ondo 0.8664 0.7288 
Oyo 0.0000 27.3128 
Plateau 0.8155 0.9410 
Rivers 0.0354 8.5802 
Sokoto 0.9651 0.2729 
Note: Hypothesis 3 tests for equality of marginal products within a region. 
As indicated by the findings in Table 6, we can rank water and telecommunication 
facilities across the regions, but not power and highways. Also, from Table 7, we infer 
that there is no significant variation in the marginal product of the infrastructures within 
16 of the 19 states. The three exceptions—Borno, Oyo and Rivers—are each characterized 
by a negative marginal product of water relative to the other infrastructure facilities. We 
suspect data measurement and/or reporting errors to be at work here, but since our source 
is the published cluster indicator surveys, there is very little we can do to improve the 
existing data set. 
Taken together, the results in tables 5,6 and 7 suggest that productivity can be improved 
by optimally reallocating investment expenditure. These hypothetically optimal allocations 
can be derived using the parameters in Table 4 to equate across the regions the marginal 
products of the infrastructure facilities (through a joint maximization programme). 
4. Conclusions 
This study uses state-level data on Nigeria to contribute to the literature on the connection 
between regional economic performance and infrastructure investment. At one level, 
our findings add to the body of accumulated evidence suggesting a correlation between 
output and the availability of certain kinds of infrastructure. At another level, it suggests 
that infrastructure can differ in the degree to which it stimulates economic activities in 
specific locations. We have also learned that there can be a great deal of variation in the 
specifics of each empirical study, which calls for more caution in comparing results 
across studies. 
For instance, Gramlich (1994) reminds us that in a comparison of a whole list of 
variables suggested to influence output across 119 countries, most of the alleged variables 
do not pass tests of statistical robustness. One variable that "definitely does not pass 
their robustness test, indeed never gets significantly positive coefficients, is the government 
capital stock". Similarly for the study by Easterly and Levine (1994), which attempted to 
explain "Africa's growth tragedy". So, combined with experiences from the present study, 
what lessons should be learned. First, that cross-country comparisons of infrastructure 
and productivity studies are tricky unless variables are comparable and, second, that 
reported results that speak to the effect of public capital should take pains to define what 
represents public capital and how it is measured. 
This call for caution is underscored herein, where although variables are comparable 
across regions, results are still statistically not robust. For instance, when we estimate an 
aggregate production function, we find almost all the variables, including labour and 
technical change, to be individually significant at the 1% level. Telecommunications is 
the only exception.10 Also, consistent with past studies, current estimates of the elasticities 
of output varied from negative (water, telecom and technical change) to positive 
(highways, power and labour). However, when the same data set is re-estimated, 
controlling for regional differences only but still imposing a common slope, we discover 
that at the 1% level, only power and labour are individually significant. In our working 
model—which allows differential slopes and intercepts—we observed that some of the 
infrastructure variables were individually significant in some of the regions. Nonetheless, 
the only consistent pattern to the whole result is the joint significance of infrastructure 
variables, which seems to rest any doubts as to the importance of public capital to economic 
activities in Nigeria. 
As stated in the beginning, this study does not specifically examine distributional 
politics or its effect on infrastructure, but it does provide the ingredient for such an 
analysis. Ultimately, the need to rank investment across regions and within a region 
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depends on the structure of decision making within a federation, as well as on the nature 
of the distributive politics. Nonetheless, in lobbying for infrastructure investments it 
would be useful for regions to get their priorities right so as to make efficient trade-offs 
at the margin. Studies such as this can serve as a springboard for the analysis. 
The finding that marginal productivity does not vary across regions suggests a logical 
extension of this study, since it is not obvious that this result is a pure happenstance, or 
an outcome of a deliberate policy of balanced investment. The principle of balanced 
investment is rooted in the fiscal federalism that came with the ascendancy of the central 
government during the 1970s, following the OPEC-oil boom.12 It was during this period 
that many key elements of accommodation were introduced, including the proportional 
allocation of federal resources. Whether the country has in fact kept faith with these "key 
elements of accommodation" makes for an interesting research agenda—one that focuses 
on the political economy of infrastructure investments. 
For each category of infrastructure, the present study has consistently estimated the 
parameters of the regional production functions needed to generate the first-best allocation 
across the regions. These optimal allocations can be compared with the actual distributions 
to secure a measure of economic distortion. The economic distortion is then used as a 
benchmark of the role of political influence. Going forward, we hope that a better 
understanding of distributive politics can help us design efficient policies on public 
expenditure. 
Finally, we acknowledge that the reliability of the kind of analysis done in this paper 
can only improve with the reduction in the severity of obstacles to the accumulation of 
data, as well as with the improvement in the measurement and consistency of data on 
infrastructure. The trend towards privatization and commercialization of public enterprises 
(in developing countries) is already a step in this direction. 
Notes 
1. q-substitutability and q-complementarity refer to the effect of the quantity of one 
resource on the marginal product of another. Economic theory does not dictate 
whether private and public capital are complements or substitutes. 
2. World Bank (1994c) estimates that infrastructure investments will account for 
between one-quarter and one-third of all fixed investments in developing countries, 
amounting to about $700-$750 billion a year. By the estimates, infrastructure 
investments in the 1990s are projected at $200 billion annually, while current 
international aid for infrastructure is about $15 billion a year. In Nigeria, the oil 
boom has financed about $175 billion of investment so far, (source on Nigeria: 
World Bank, 1995b). 
3. Nigeria's finance minister expressed concern over the high internal debt overhang 
and the use to which the funds were put: "Perhaps, the most painful aspect of our 
predicament in this area is that much of the expenditures that gave rise to the deficit 
were on projects and programmes that were either incapable of yielding any dividend 
howsoever defined or are so badly mismanaged that their upkeep or revival is in 
itself an additional drain on the public purse" (Offoaro, 1996: 2). 
4. Borensztein (1994), quoted in IMF Survey No. 24(3), 6 February, 1995, p. 48. 
5. Econometric problems such as causality issues, simultaneity bias, specification errors, 
non-stationarity, and common trends. 
6. Botswana is an example. The Governor of the Bank of Botswana notes that "a good 
social and physical infrastructure—one of the best in Africa" simply has not produced 
the trickle-down effect on the scale or at the speed which the planners anticipated" 
(Address to 1995 BOCCIM Annual General Meeting, 21 June 1995). 
7. A telephone main line connects the subscriber's equipment to the switched network 
and has a dedicated port at the exchange. The correct indicators for power 
infrastructure are the capacity to import energy (transmission infrastructure) and the 
spannage (distribution infrastructure). The relevant data sets comprising specifications 
and capacities include total circuit length of high tension transmission lines in 
kilometres, total injection substation capacity in megavolts amps (MYA), total circuit 
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length of low tension transmission lines in kilometres, total installed distribution 
capacity in MVA (composed of capacities of distribution transformers and distribution 
substations). Regrettably, such proper data sets were unavailable. 
Some research, including the World Bank's World Development Report 1994, 
have used installed capacity of electricity generating plants as a proxy for power. 
However, we prefer power consumed as an indicator of the measurement of the 
contribution of electricity to productive activities. The reason is that considerable 
amounts of generated power are lost in the transmission and distribution process 
(system losses). 
8. Chief Awolowo was one of Nigeria's premier nationalists. He was the first leader of 
the opposition group in the first republic, and the first premier of the Western Region. 
He was later jailed for treason, was released and became minister of finance during 
the period of the Nigerian civil war. Chief Awolowo was several times a presidential 
candidate, but is remembered most for his foresight and dedication to the cause of 
economic development in the Western Region. In the history of free primary education 
in Nigeria, he outdistanced everybody with his early introduction of free primary 
education in the west. 
9. This test is always non-negative since the likelihood of the unconstrained model is 
necessarily higher than that of the constrained model. 
10. The contribution of telecommunications infrastructure is hardly surprising, 
considering the quality of telecommunications services as discussed in the section 
on data profile. Additionally, we suspect that in the aggregate, it could be highly 
intercorrelated with highways. 
11. Oil royalties and revenue from crude oil sales accrue to the Federal Government. 
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Annex: Data sources 
1. The figures for the various state gross domestic products (SGDP), and the state 
consumer price indexes are from the Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos (FOS), and 
Job (1997). Real SGDP is derived by deflating the nominal SGDP by the consumer 
price index for that state. 
2. Data on capacity utilization are from the annual reports of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
for the various years. The capacity utilization figures for 1990 and 1993 are revised 
figures as reported in the Central Bank of Nigeria annual reports for the years 1991 
and 1994, respectively. 
3. Information on labour force uses the 1991 population census as the base data to 
derive the state labour force for the period 1985-1995. Both the data on the 
economically active population and the growth rate of the population were used to 
derive the population figures for the non-census years, namely 1985-1990 and 1992-
1995. The 1991 report by the Nigerian Population Commission is that the 
Commission does not believe in the 1963 census. Therefore, the figures from the 
1963 census were not part of the growth rate of 2.89% used in the projection for the 
non-census years. The growth rate was derived from the census of 1952/53 and that 
of 1991. As used by FOS, an employed person is said to be economically active, i.e., 
"all persons of either sex which furnish the supply of labour available for the 
production of goods and services". Source of data for economically active population 
is Census, National Summary, National Population Commission Census 1991. Source 
of the state-level data on the unemployment rate is FOS. 
4. Gross private sector capital formation is in millions of naira. Source is FOS. The 
method used to derive the reported figures modifies that used in aggregating the 
state gross domestic product. The numbers for the state-level gross domestic 
investment are components of the state domestic product and thus were derived 
from the tables of SGDP. To arrive at the capital stock, we used the average investment 
over the 11-year period as the base capital stock and then cumulated the investment. 
Nigeria does not report capital stock as part of the national accounts statistics. It 
reports only gross total (public and private) investment. 
5. Power (electricity) consumed is measured in gigawatt hours (million kilowatt hours). 
Data source is FOS (National Income Accounts Office), Lagos. 
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6. Acess to safe water is measured in percentages of the population of the respective 
states. The estimates are based on FOS surveys for about 6 years out of the 11 years 
reported. Additional source for water is, "Federal Republic of Nigeria, Multiple 
Cluster Indicator Survey: March 1995," in UNICEF at 50:1946-1996. Lagos: Federal 
Office of Statistics and UNICEF (1996). 
7. The source of telecommunications data is NITEL Pic Abuja, and NITEL Pic, Public 
Relations Office, Gerard Street, Ikoyi, Lagos. The data sets for 1990 and 1992 were 
decomposed from the zonal sales (lines installed) data for 1990-1992. The criterion 
is the 1992 distribution of sales returns from the states. The ratio for each state is the 
weight used in apportioning the total zonal sales to the constituent states. 
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